This blogospheric singularity stuff is getting out of hand. Don't get me wrong, I find it all pretty interesting. But it's not a new idea, nor is it being pursued very thoroughly. Nerds have talked about this stuff for ages. I haven't ever bothered to delve into it very deeply, but even I realize that the current discussions (seemingly led by Kevin Drum) are fairly superficial (no offense, Kevin). This seems to be because they're being shaped by a single book. So, because I can't help myself, a few quick points in response to Drum's latest:

• The word "singularity", at least in the formulations I'm familiar with, is used in a technical sense to denote a moment in history beyond which the future cannot be predicted. This is commonly expected to be the rise of machine intelligence, or the digitization of human consciousness — it doesn't really matter. The point of the term is that the consequences of the event for society cannot be predicted. This is where the name comes from — the analogy that provides the name is to matter that has entered a black hole (where its information was thought to be lost). Stephen Hawking has made this analogy probably incorrect, but still: trying to figure out the singularity's implications is incoherent by definition. That isn't stopping anyone, of course, so let's just plunge ahead.


• Drum quotes Kurzweil citing Libet's experiments showing that motor planning for a voluntary action precedes our perception of the corresponding volition. I'm actually very sympathetic to Kurzweil's interpretation of this evidence, and think it does strongly suggest that traditional conceptions of free will are wrong. But it's worth pointing out that further investigation has shown that people may be able to, at the last minute, "short circuit" the motor program that formed before they become aware of their impulse. Some people grab onto this milliseconds-long window as a refuge for free will. I'm not a fan of that position, but (last I checked) the debate over Libet's work isn't as clear-cut as the quoted Kurzweil indicates. Now, if you consider consciousness to be an epiphenomenon, the problems presented by Libet's work recede. But then you have to decide what free will means in the context of a consciousness that is caused but doesn't cause anything else. I'm okay with that, but most people don't like it much.


• Finally (and most germane to Drum's post), I'll point out that "if a) free will proves to be an illusion then b) humans will give up and cease trying to preserve their existence" isn't very well-justified. Drum realizes this, and admits that it wouldn't be a free-will-style choice. But he doesn't offer any compelling reason for the initial doubt — why should out hard-wired behavior lead us to existential defeat? If conscious will is out of the picture, what's going to counteract a strong inbuilt drive for self-preservation? So far as I can tell, the "give up" hypothesis really has nothing going for it.

Anyway, it's all probably irrelevant: as always when thinking about free will, the most important thing is to ignore your conclusions. If anything, that's what we're hard-wired to do.